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Legal Regulations Relating to the Passive and 
Active Legal Capacity of Persons with 
Intellectual and Psychosocial Disabilities in 
Light of the Convention on the Rights of 
Persons with Disabilities and the Impending 
Reform of the Hungarian Civil Code 
ISTVÁN HOFFMAN* & GYÖRGY KÖNCZEI** 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
In order to examine the application of the principle of equality 
before the law, we must first define the group of people who we regard 
as persons with disabilities for the purposes of this study. The term 
“mental” was once used to refer to people with intellectual or 
psychiatric disabilities.1 The approach used in this study is the one 
introduced and adopted in the course of the travaux préparatoires of 
Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD or 
 
* István Hoffman is a Ph.D. in Administrative Law. He is now a Lecturer of the Department of 
Administrative Law at Faculty of Law and Political Sciences of Eötvös Loránd University, 
Budapest (Hungary) and Associate Professor of the College for Modern Business Studies, 
Tatabánya (Hungary). He is doing research on Administrative Law (especially on the 
management of public services) and social law (especially law of equal opportunities and 
disability law). 
** György Könczei dr. habil., D.Sc., Ph.D. is a Professor of Disability Studies and former Dean 
of the Bárczi Gusztáv Faculty of Special Education of Eötvös Loránd University, Budapest 
(Hungary). He is the Chair of the Governmental Committee for the European Social Charter, 
Council of Europe, Strasbourg and member of the Committee on the Rights of Persons with 
Disabilities under Article 34 of the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities. He is 
doing research in Disability Studies (especially the fundamental rights of the persons with 
disabilities). 
 1. Cf. Kevin K. Walsh, Thoughts on Changing the Term Mental Retardation, in 40 
MENTAL RETARDATION 70, 71–72 (2002) (discussing the changes in terminology referring to 
disabled people). 
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Convention),2 which speaks of persons with intellectual or 
psychological disabilities.3 
A.  Defining Persons with Intellectual Disabilities 
1.  The Traditional Civil Law Approach Under the Civil Law System 
Traditional civil law, based on Roman law, approaches the issue 
primarily from the perspective of a person’s active legal capacity.4 As 
we shall demonstrate below, under traditional civil law, the active legal 
capacity of a person who lacks the mental or cognitive ability to 
conduct his own affairs is restricted or denied. 
As medical knowledge was limited, this approach was initially 
based on an assessment of a person’s actual participation in society.5 
That is to say, if a person’s conduct failed to comply with certain 
religious and moral customs and norms, he or she was regarded as 
lacking active legal capacity (a capacity to act). Indeed, in many 
instances, the person’s passive legal capacity (a capacity for rights) was 
also denied.6  
Nineteenth century developments in medicine (particularly in the 
fields of neurology and psychiatry), however, established the pre-
eminence of the medical approach (or social approach) to disability by 
the beginning of the twentieth century.7 Under this approach, any person 
with limited cognitive abilities or a diagnosable neurological or 
psychiatric condition was defined as a person with disabilities. 
Intellectual disability and the issue of active legal capacity were viewed 
as both medical and legal matters.8  
 
 2. Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, G.A. Res. 61/106, U.N. Doc. 
A/RES/61/106 (Dec. 13, 2006) [hereinafter CRPD]. 
 3. See id. arts. 1, 16, ¶ 2. 
 4. See Benjamin Brake & Peter J. Katzenstein, The Transnational Spread of American 
Law:  Legalization as Soft Power, INST. FOR INT’L L. AND JUST., 14 (June 2010), http://www.iilj. 
org/courses/documents/HC2010Oct22.Katzenstein.pdf; RHONA K.M. SMITH, TEXTBOOK ON 
INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS 185–86 (3d ed. 2007). 
 5. See Paul Varul et al., Restrictions on Active Legal Capacity, 9 JURIDICA INT’L 99, 100 
(2004), available at http://www.juridicainternational.eu/public/pdf/ji_2004_1_99.pdf. 
 6. See id. at 100; Xinyan Ma & Gouqiang Li, On Adult Deficiency of Capacity for Conduct 
and Perfection of Adult Guardianship System:  With Consideration to System Arrangement of 
Civil Code, 2 U.S.–CHINA L. REV. 27, 30–31 (2005). 
 7. Julie Mulvany, Disability, Impairment or Illness? The Relevance of the Social Model of 
Disability to the Study of Mental Disorder, in RETHINKING OF THE SOCIOLOGY OF MENTAL 
HEALTH 40–41 (Joan Busfield ed., 2001). 
 8. See SZLADITS KÁROLY, A MAGYAR MAGÁNJOG VÁZLATA [AN OUTLINE OF 
HUNGARIAN CIVIL LAW] 80–81, 137 (1937) (discussing the medical approach in a major work on 
Hungarian civil law). 
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However, because it could not address certain life circumstances, 
the medical approach was never fully implemented. Moreover, the 
effects of particular medical conditions on the cognitive abilities of 
various individuals were not uniform.9 The civil law system sought to 
address these circumstances by means of a general provision, 
effectively giving judges a free hand. In our opinion the general 
provision tended to use the following formula:  “the lack of cognitive 
abilities for other reasons.” 
2.  The Human Rights Approach to Disability 
In the second half of the twentieth century, the international 
protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms was enhanced, 
partly in response to the abuses that had taken place under dictatorial 
regimes in the 1930s and 1940s.10 Similarly, national constitutions and 
basic laws gave increased attention to developing proper safeguards for 
human rights.11 
The development of human rights became manifest above all in 
legal provisions ensuring equality before the law as well as equal 
opportunities.12 Other provisions sought to promote the dignity of every 
human person.13 
As a result of such legal developments, the safeguarding of the 
rights of persons with disabilities became a priority as a human right. 
This, in turn, required a complete reappraisal of the notion of 
disability.14 
International human rights norms (such as the CRPD) as well as 
recent national legal norms (such as Germany’s Law on the Equality of 
People with Disabilities (LEPD))15 have adopted a complex definition of 
 
 9. See Mulvany, supra note 7, at 39–40. 
 10. See DAVID MORRISON, REALIZING HUMAN RIGHTS 39–40 (1996), available at 
http://www.strathmor.com/assets/pdf/realizing%20human%20rights%20-%20final.pdf. For an 
example of the so-called “euthanasia” program in Nazi Germany, see Michael Burleigh, The 
Legacy of Nazi Medicine in Context, in MEDICINE AND MEDICAL ETHICS IN NAZI GERMANY 112, 
113–14 (Francis R. Nicosia & Jonathan Huener eds., 2002). 
 11. CURTIS F.J. DOEBBLER, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW:  CASES AND 
MATERIALS 8–11 (2004). 
 12. See  Raymond Lang, The United Nations Convention on the Right and Dignities for 
Persons with Disability:  A Panacea For Ending Disability Discrimination?, 3 EUR. J. 
DISABILITY RES. 266, 268 (2009). 
 13. See SMITH, supra note 4, at 185–86. 
 14. Ann Macfarlane, Aspects of Intervention:  Consultation, Care, Help and Support, in 
BEYOND DISABILITY:  TOWARDS AN ENABLING SOCIETY 6, 6–8 (Gerald Hales ed., 1996). 
 15. Behindertengleichstellungsgesetz [BGG] [Law on Equal Opportunities for Disabled 
People], Apr. 27, 2002, BGBL. I at 1467, last amended by Gesetz [G], Dec. 19, 2007, BGBL. I at 
3024, art. 12 (Ger.), available at http://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/bundesrecht/bgg/gesamt.pdf. 
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disability,16 incorporating medical and social factors.17 In this holistic 
definition, intellectual, cognitive, or sensory impairment is just one 
consideration; each alone is not a sufficient condition.18 The definition 
requires the presence of a long-term impairment hindering the 
individual’s full and effective participation in society.19 
This complex definition, incorporating social elements, has been 
applied in various national and international documents in the early 
twenty-first century.20 Since this notion of disability is capable of 
expressing the factual nature of disability, that a biological impairment 
fundamentally limits a person’s social involvement, for the purposes of 
this paper, disability will be understood in accordance with the above 
complex, or holistic, definition.21 
B.  The Legal Status of Disability in the Various Fields of Law 
Concerning the legal status of disability, we shall principally 
examine provisions in the various fields of law relating to passive legal 
capacity (a capacity for rights) and active legal capacity (a capacity to 
act). 
The sedes materiae of these provisions are to be found in civil 
law,22 but in the practice and safeguarding of fundamental rights, legal 
provisions relating to constitutional rights are also salient. For instance, 
 
 16. See ANDREAS DIMOPOULOS, ISSUES IN HUMAN RIGHTS PROTECTION OF 
INTELLECTUALLY DISABLED PERSONS 71 (2010). 
 17. Thus the CRPD—ratified by Hungary in Act XCII of 2007—contains the following 
definition:  “Persons with disabilities include those who have long-term physical, mental, 
intellectual or sensory impairments which in interaction with various barriers may hinder their 
full and effective participation in society on an equal basis with others.” CRPD, supra note 2, 
art. 1, ¶ 2; Hungary:  Parliament Reforms Legal Capacity Laws, MENTAL DISABILITY 
ADVOCACY CTR. (Sept. 22, 2009), http://mdac.info/hungary-parliament-reforms-legal-capacity-
laws. 
 18. See JAVAID REHMAN, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW 611–12 (2d ed. 2010); see 
also Melinda Jones & Lee Ann Basser Marks, Law and the Social Construction of Disability, in 
DISABILITY, DIVERS-ABILITY, AND LEGAL CHANGE 1, 4–6 (Melinda Jones & Lee Ann Basser 
Marks eds., 1999). 
 19. CRPD, supra note 2, art. 1. 
 20. See Varul et al., supra note 5, at 101. But see Penny Letts, The Protection of People 
Without Mental Capacity, in ELDER ABUSE WORK:  BEST PRACTICE IN BRITAIN AND CANADA 
252, 252–53 (Jacki Pritchard ed., 1999) (emphasizing that United Kingdom legislation adopted in 
the 1980s and 1990s applies the medical approach in the field of intellectual disabilities).  
 21. See Peter Mittler, Meeting the Needs of People with an Intellectual Disability:  
International Perspectives, in THE HUMAN RIGHTS OF PERSONS WITH INTELLECTUAL 
DISABILITIES:  DIFFERENT BUT EQUAL 25, 28 (Stanley S. Herr et al. eds., 2003).  
 22. See JOHN PARRY & ERIC Y. DROGIN, MENTAL DISABILITY LAW, EVIDENCE AND 
TESTIMONY:  A COMPREHENSIVE REFERENCE MANUAL FOR LAWYERS, JUDGES AND MENTAL 
DISABILITY PROFESSIONALS 7–9 (2007). 
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if a person has restricted electoral rights (a restriction or deprivation of 
active and/or passive voting rights) owing to her disabilities, this will 
also reduce his or her effective participation in society, since he or she 
cannot take part in the making of decisions that affect the community or 
can do so only in a limited manner. 
Through the aforementioned basic institutions, we can review the 
relationship of the legal system to the life situations of people with 
disabilities. In order to give a clear answer to this question, however, we 
must first define the meaning of the terms passive legal capacity (a 
capacity for rights) and active legal capacity (a capacity to act). 
C.  Passive Legal Capacity (a Capacity for Rights) and Active Legal 
Capacity (a Capacity to Act) 
1.  Passive and Active Legal Capacity in Civil Law Systems 
In countries with civil law systems, a sharp distinction is made be-
tween passive and active legal capacity.23 This distinction goes beyond 
the difference found in classical Roman law between the capacity to sue 
and the capacity to be sued.24 Based on the dogmatic results of Roman 
jurisprudence, in civil law systems passive legal capacity means the ca-
pacity of a person to have rights and duties, while active legal capacity 
means that a person can cause rights and duties to arise through his ac-
tions with regard to both himself and others.25 
In contemporary substantive civil law, a sharp distinction is made 
between passive and active legal capacity. The two terms are interde-
 
 23. These countries include the countries of the European Continent, Middle and South 
America (Latin America), the former member states of the USSR, Québec (Canada) and 
Louisiana (USA). Scotland and South Africa have a mixed (civil law and common law) legal 
system. See HAMZA GÁBOR, AZ EURÓPAI MAGÁNJOG FEJLŐDÉSE:  A MODERN MAGÁNJOGI 
RENDSZEREK KIALAKULÁSA A RÓMAI JOGI HAGYOMÁNYOK ALAPJÁN [THE DEVELOPMENT OF 
EUROPEAN CIVIL LAW:  THE DEVELOPMENT OF MODERN SYSTEMS OF CIVIL LAW BASED ON 
THE TRADITIONS OF ROMAN LAW] 21–23 (2002) [hereinafter THE DEVELOPMENT OF EUROPEAN 
CIVIL LAW]; GÁBOR HAMZA, DIE ENTWICKLUNG DES PRIVATRECHTS AUF 
RÖMISCHRECHTLICHER GRUNDLAGE:  UNTER BESONDERER BERÜCKSICHTIGUNG DER 
RECHTSENTWICKLUNG IN DEUTSCHLAND, ÖSTERREICH, DER SCHWEIZ UND UNGARN [THE 
DEVELOPMENT OF CIVIL LAW FROM ROMAN LEGAL TRADITIONS:  WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE 
TO LEGAL DEVELOPMENTS IN GERMANY, AUSTRIA, SWITZERLAND, AND HUNGARY] 9–10 (2002) 
[hereinafter THE DEVELOPMENT OF CIVIL LAW FROM ROMAN LEGAL TRADITIONS]. 
 24. FÖLDI ANDRÁS & HAMZA GÁBOR, A RÓMAI JOG TÖRTÉNETE ÉS INSTITÚCIÓI [THE 
HISTORY AND INSTITUTIONS OF ROMAN LAW] 228–29 (2001).  Similar to traditional common 
law, Classical Roman law did not recognize the abstract notion of subjective (civil) rights. It 
treated rights basically as rights of litigation. Id. 
 25. Id. at 203, 225. Based on Roman law recognizing slavery, this could also mean that 
passive and active legal capacity diverged—a competent person could be without active legal 
capacity, and an incompetent slave could have active legal capacity. Id. 
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pendent, even though since the abolition of the institution of slavery in 
advanced countries in the mid-nineteenth century, almost everyone has 
had passive legal capacity. By the mid-twentieth century, this principle 
had become a universal one, at least at the legal level. Indeed, a ban on 
slavery is contained in the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights,26 adopted under the auspices of the United Nations. Concerning 
active legal capacity, contemporary private substantive law has pre-
served the Roman law foundations; thus, a person has active legal ca-
pacity where she can, through her own actions, obtain rights for herself 
or for someone else, or assume obligations.27 
The situation differs slightly in the field of procedural law, where 
no such sharp distinction is made between passive and active legal 
capacity.28 Thus, similar to codes of procedure in other countries, the 
Hungarian Code of Civil Procedure (Act III of 1952 on the Code of 
Civil Procedure) recognizes a person’s capacity to sue and be sued, 
which effectively embodies both passive legal capacity and active legal 
capacity.29 The capacity to sue and be sued can be broken down into two 
elements:  first, a capacity for rights in a court of law, which is due to 
almost all natural persons as well as legal persons and, on occasion, 
even to entities without legal personality or legal subjectivity (e.g., the 
county social and guardianship offices in the context of administrative 
lawsuits);30 second, the capacity to act in a court of law, which is 
broader in scope than the civil law capacity to act (e.g., in guardianship 
suits, a person with limited capacity to act has full capacity to sue).31 
In the field of constitutional law, we may highlight electoral law. 
Based on active and passive electoral rights, individuals can take part in 
the making of decisions that affect the community. Historically, a sharp 
distinction has been made between electoral rights and active legal 
 
 26. REHMAN, supra note 18, at 85. 
 27. For more on the definition of active legal capacity, see BARNABÁS LENKOVICS & 
LÁSZLÓ SZÉKELY, A SZEMÉLYI JOG VÁZLATA [THE OUTLINE OF PERSONAL RIGHTS] 31 (2000) 
(Hung.); FÁBIÁN FERENC & SÁGHY MÁRIA, POLGÁRI JOG I. [HUNGARIAN CIVIL LAW, VOL. I], 
20–22 (2007); J.M. Thomson, Private Law Aspects of Parents’ and Children’s Rights in Scotland, 
in 1 FRONTIERS OF LIABILITY 191, 197 (P.B.H. Birks ed., 1994). 
 28. MIKLÓS KENGYEL, MAGYAR POLGÁRI ELJÁRÁSJOG [HUNGARIAN CIVIL PROCEDURE 
LAW] 133–34 (2001). 
 29. Id. 
 30. See 1 LÁSZLÓ TÖLG-MOLNÁR, POLGÁRI ELJÁRÁSJOG [CIVIL PROCEDURE LAW] 87–88 
(2006) (Hung.); A POLGÁRI PERRENDTARTÁS MAGYARÁZATA I–II. [AN EXPLANATION OF THE 
CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, VOL. I–II] 247–48 (János Németh ed., 1999) (Hung.). 
 31. AN EXPLANATION OF THE CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, supra note 30, at 243, 255–56, 
1290. 
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capacity in civil law.32 By the twentieth century, however, with the 
spread of universal suffrage in Europe, the two became 
interconnected—electoral rights were linked with a person’s full active 
legal capacity in civil law.33 Modern constitutional law sometimes 
exceeds this, particularly with regard to the rights of children and young 
people. Indeed, in some countries, such as Austria, active voting rights 
have been granted to young people who have not reached the age of full 
legal capacity in civil law.34 
In penal law, a sharp distinction is made between passive and 
active legal capacity as well. Only a person with a capacity for guilt can 
be held responsible for criminal acts.35 An age limit is also applied in 
the case of capacity for guilt, but this age limit is lower than the age 
limit for active legal capacity in civil law.36 Furthermore, persons with 
intellectual disabilities are usually granted exemptions.37 Here, we 
should also emphasize that in penal law, the medical model (a person’s 
pathological mental state) is still applied when defining or assessing 
intellectual disability.38 
2.  Passive and Active Legal Capacity in Common Law Systems 
In the private law of common law systems, which resembles in 
many respects the logic of classical Roman law,39 no sharp distinction is 
made between passive legal capacity (a capacity for rights) and active 
legal capacity (a capacity to act).40 Indeed, in common law systems, it is 
only under the influence of civil law systems—and, above all, statute 
law—that the abstract notion of “subjective right” (or “civil right”) has 
 
 32. See BRUCE RUSSETT, GRASPING THE DEMOCRATIC PEACE:  PRINCIPLES FOR A POST-
COLD WAR WORLD 15 (1993). 
 33. See, e.g., COUNCIL OF EUROPE, ELECTORAL SYSTEMS AND VOTING PROCEDURES AT 
LOCAL LEVEL 41 (1999). 
 34. Austria First to Lower Voting Age to 16, USA TODAY (Sept. 25, 2008), 
http://www.usatoday.com/news/world/2008-09-25-austria-voting-age_N.htm. In federal and most 
member states’ (Länder) elections in Austria, young people aged over 16 have voting rights. 
Similar to the federal regulation, various provinces have also reduced the age limit for active 
voting rights in provincial parliamentary elections. The age limit for passive voting rights has not 
been reduced. Pat Maadi, Parliament Approves New Laws, WIENER ZEITUNG (June 5, 2007), 
available at http://www.eduhi.at/dl/2007-06-05_Wiener_Zeitung._Parliament_approves_new_ 
laws.doc. 
 35. Kristina Karsay, Criminal Responsibility of Minors in National and International Legal 
Order, 75 INT’L REV. PENAL L. 379, 379 (2004). 
 36. See id. 
 37. See id. at 381. 
 38. JOHN DELANEY, LEARNING CRIMINAL LAW AS ADVOCACY ARGUMENT 30 (2004). 
 39. Brake & Katzenstein, supra note 4, at 14. 
 40. See SMITH, supra note 4, at 251 (discussing both active and passive legal capacity, but 
failing to distinguish between the two). 
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arisen.41 In common law systems, legal precedents establish principles 
and rules, meaning that rights are inevitably linked to their 
enforceability before a court of law.42 It is the ability to take a stand 
before a court of law, an ability that incorporates both passive and 
active legal capacity, that has traditionally been referred to in English 
legal speech as legal capacity.43 This term most closely resembles the 
capacity to sue and be sued of procedural law in civil law systems.  
In the fields of penal law and constitutional law, the above 
conclusions are still applicable despite the differences between the 
common law system and the civil law system.  
II.  A SURVEY OF THE PRINCIPAL HISTORICAL MODELS RELATING TO THE 
PASSIVE AND ACTIVE LEGAL CAPACITY OF PERSONS WITH INTELLECTUAL 
DISABILITIES 
A.  Legal Provisions Relating to the Passive and Active Legal Capacity 
of Persons with Intellectual Disabilities—From Roman Law to the 
Legal Situation Prevailing in the Mid-Twentieth Century 
1.  The Pre-Modern Era and Traditional Legal Systems  
In the pre-modern classical and medieval eras, the legal status of 
people with disabilities was poor. Disability always implied a 
restriction of a person’s active legal capacity.44  
According to the law of ancient Rome, a person was deprived of 
active legal capacity not only by a mental disorder or illness, but also 
other physical disabilities, such as blindness and especially muteness.45 
In late, post-classical Roman law, however, the beginnings of an 
attempt to understand disability may be observed. For instance, if a 
person with a mental disorder or illness was capable of making rational 
decisions in his “lighter moments” (lucidum intervallum), then that 
person was to be regarded as having full active legal capacity under the 
decrees of Emperor Diocletian and Emperor Justinian.46 Thus, under 
 
 41. See James H. Hutson, The Emergence of the Modern Concept of a Right in America:  
The Contribution of Michael Villey, 39 AM. J. JURIS. 185, 196–97, 205–06 (1994). 
 42. See, e.g., Harry N. Wyatt, Common Law Constitutional Interpretation, 63 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 877, 883, 887–88, 892–95, 897–98 (1996) (discussing enforceability of inheritance rights). 
 43. PARRY & DROGIN, supra note 22, at 7. 
 44. However, Hungarian feudal (medieval) law presumed (mental) sanity. See BELIZNAY 
KINGA ET AL., MAGYAR JOGTÖRTÉNET [HISTORY OF HUNGARIAN LAW] 80 (Mezey Marna ed., 
1996). 
 45. Id. 
 46. FÖLDI & HAMZA, supra note 24, at 228–29. 
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these decrees, a person was only defined as disabled if he or she was 
incapable of effective participation in society.47  
Even so, disability could have had grave consequences in pre-
modern law and continues to have grave consequences in the traditional 
legal systems of our own era.48 For instance, during the medieval period, 
people with intellectual or physical disabilities were often viewed as 
witches or as being possessed by the devil.49 In such cases, they were 
deprived of passive legal capacity and sometimes even murdered.50 
In certain traditional legal systems, people with disabilities are 
deprived of their active legal capacity, and occasionally, their passive 
legal capacity.51 Since traditional legal systems continue to exist in 
developing countries, Article 12(2) of the CRPD underlines the need to 
recognize the legal capacity of persons with disabilities everywhere.52  
By way of summary, we can state that the legal systems of the pre-
modern era almost universally restricted the active legal capacity of 
people with disabilities; further, in some instances, these systems even 
deprived them of passive legal capacity.  
2.  Modern Legal Systems Until the Twentieth Century 
With the development of modern legal systems, generally 
recognition is now given to the fact that legal capacity is due to every 
person, irrespective of disability. In modern private law, reflecting the 
dogmatism of Roman jurisprudence, a clear distinction is made between 
passive and active legal capacity.53  
Under the civil law codes, restricting a person’s active legal 
capacity was possible on three grounds:  the person’s age, an inability to 
express her will (e.g., intoxication), and mental illness or (congenital) 
mental disability.54  
Section 489 of the French Code Civil of 1804, the first great code 
of civil law, recognized incompetence based on person’s age, an 
inability to express her will (“imbécillité”), and incompetence arising 
 
 47. Id. 
 48. See  BELIZNAY KINGA ET AL., supra note 44, at 73, 80. 
 49. Deborah W. Denno, Sexuality, Rape, and Mental Retardation, 1997 U. ILL. L. REV. 315, 
325 (1997). 
 50. Id. 
 51. For example, in the People’s Republic of China, there is a family-based guardianship 
system. See Yang Shao et al., Current Legislation on Admission on of Mentally Ill Patients in 
China, 33 INT’L J.L. & PSYCHIATRY 52, 56 (2010).  
 52. CRPD, supra note 2, art. 12, ¶ 2. 
 53. See Thomson, supra note 27, at 196. 
 54. For the various grounds, see LENKOVICS & SZÉKELY, supra note 27, at 23–25. 
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from mental illness.55 Under Section 489 of the Code Civil, adults 
lacking capacity were placed under guardianship.56 The Code Civil also 
recognized the notion of diminished legal capacity; in such cases, a 
legal statement made by the person under guardianship was subject to 
the guardian’s approval.57 Based on examples from the Roman law, the 
Code Civil declared unilateral legal statements by persons with 
diminished active legal capacity as invalid.58  
The above model was repeated in the Austrian Civil Code 
(Allgemeines Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch), proclaimed seven years later in 
1811 and entered into force in 1812.59 Under Section 273 of the 
Austrian Civil Code, the mentally ill had active legal capacity but were 
under guardianship.60 The Austrian Civil Code regulated diminished 
active legal capacity in a manner similar to that of the Code Civil. Thus, 
the legal transactions of a person with diminished active legal capacity 
were subject to the approval of a guardian.61 Furthermore, the Austrian 
Civil Code also applied the invalidity of unilateral acts in certain areas.62 
Perhaps the clearest instance of legal incompetence derived from 
Roman jurisprudence and reflecting the medical advances of the 
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries is found in the German Civil Code 
(Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch), which was adopted in 1896 and entered into 
force in 1900.63 Under Section 104 of the original German Civil Code, a 
person of seven years of age or less, or an individual who was unable to 
express his will or who had been rendered a person under guardianship 
due to mental illness, had no active legal capacity.64  
Sections 114 and 115 of the original German Civil Code 
prescribed restrictions on the active legal capacity of minors aged 
between seven and eighteen and of individuals with mental disability or 
illness or addiction (the latter included alcoholism and nicotine 
 
 55. See  1 ÉMILE ACOLLAS, MANUEL DE DROIT CIVIL:  A L’USAGE DES ETUDIANTS 
[HANDBOOK OF CIVIL LAW FOR STUDENTS] 411 (1869). 
 56. HENRY CACHARD, THE FRENCH CIVIL CODE, WITH VARIOUS AMENDMENTS THERETO:  
AS IN FORCE ON MARCH 15, 1895 121 (1895). 
 57. Id. at 111, 125. 
 58. Varul et al., supra note 5, at 104. 
 59. THE DEVELOPMENT OF CIVIL LAW FROM ROMAN LEGAL TRADITIONS, supra note 23, at 
103–06. 
 60. ALLGEMEINES BÜRGERLICHES GESETZBUCH [ABGB] [CIVIL CODE] § 273 (Austria). 
 61. EUGEN BLEULER, LEHRBUCH DER PSYCHIATRIE [TEXTBOOK OF PSYCHIATRY] 674–75 
(Manfred Bleuler ed., 15th ed. 1983) (Ger.). 
 62. Id. at 675. 
 63. THE DEVELOPMENT OF CIVIL LAW FROM ROMAN LEGAL TRADITIONS, supra note 23, at 
96–97. 
 64. CHUNG HUI WANG, THE GERMAN CIVIL CODE 23 (1907). 
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addiction according to the text of the original Code).65 Similarly, here, 
active legal capacity was subject to guardianship provisions.66 In other 
words, the approval of a guardian was required; legal transactions based 
on statements made by such persons were subject to the invalidity of the 
unilateral statements rule, negotium claudicans, whereby the 
incompetence of a person could only be cited as grounds for 
invalidating a legal transaction in the interest of the person.67 Moreover, 
under labor law68 and inheritance law, some legal statements were still 
considered invalid even when they had been approved by the guardian.69  
The great codes of civil law represented an advance in the sense 
that they recognized and prescribed the general and full passive legal 
capacity of people with disabilities. Even so, reflecting Roman law and 
the state of medical knowledge, jurisprudence in the period continued to 
define persons with intellectual disabilities and the mentally ill as 
lacking active legal capacity.70 They were made subject to guardians 
who represented them fully and in all areas.71  
Concerning addictions and other disabilities regarded as less 
serious by medicine, the above great codes of civil law made reference 
to restricted active legal capacity, thus offering a degree of 
independence to persons under guardianship.72 However, in all major 
legal transactions, the approval of the legal representatives (guardians) 
was a prerequisite.73 In the field of labor law and inheritance law, the 
invalidity of unilateral statements usually applied.74  
B.  Passive and Active Legal Capacity in Hungarian Law 
1.  Passive and Active Legal Capacity in Feudal Hungarian Law 
Until the introduction of the Hungarian Civil Code, Hungarian law 
was based on common law. That is to say, there were no codified 
 
 65. Id. at 25. 
 66. Id. at 23, 25. 
 67. Id. 
 68. HORVÁTH ISTVÁN, MUNKAJOG [LABOR LAW] 32–34 (2007) (Hung.). 
 69. HANS BROX, ALLGEMEINER TEIL DES BÜRGERLICHEN GESETZBUCHS [GENERAL PART 
OF THE CIVIL CODE] 105–12 (2., erg. Aufl. 1978) (Ger.). 
 70. See Varul et al., supra note 5, at 102. 
 71. Id. 
 72. Id. at 103. 
 73. Id. at 104. 
 74. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF EMPLOYMENT LAW app. B (2009) (discussing the 
various states’ rejection of unilateral statements). 
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rules.75 Instead, various documents of common law played a decisive 
role.76 Werbőczy’s Tripartitum was the first major survey of Hungarian 
common law.77 
The Tripartitum suggests that in principle, disability did not 
influence the legal capacity of people under feudal status law.78 
Although Werbőczy’s Tripartitum sought to apply the dogma and 
terminology of Roman law to Hungarian law, it nevertheless differed 
dogmatically from works based on traditional Roman law.79 Under 
Roman law, the principal distinction between custody and guardianship 
was that custody served as a replacement for parental authority, while 
guardianship sought to provide a representative for a person with 
diminished active legal capacity.80 In contrast, in customary Hungarian 
civil law, custody and guardianship were distinguished according to 
whether there was a requirement to care for the person, in addition to 
the supervision of property. Where there was such a requirement, the 
relationship was one of custody; otherwise, it was one of guardianship.81 
Thus, under Hungarian feudal customary law, persons with intellectual 
disabilities were placed under custody while “wayward fools” were 
placed under guardianship.82 
These provisions, however, did not represent a real difference as 
far as active legal capacity was concerned, since in both instances, the 
legal regulations of property relating to guardianship were applied. As 
far as property law was concerned, custody and guardianship status 
were similar to diminished active legal capacity, since the ward (the 
person under guardianship) was limited in the extent to which he could 
make legal statements.83 
 
 75. Kazimierz Grzybowski, Reform of Civil Law in Hungary, Poland, and the Soviet Union, 
10 AM. J. COMP. L. 253, 253 (1961). 
 76. Id.; BELIZNAY ET AL., supra note 44, at 73–75.  
 77. IGNÁC FRANK, A KÖZIGAZSÁG TÖRVÉNYE MAGYARHONBAN [HUNGARIAN PUBLIC AND 
PRIVATE LAW] 64–66, 179, 183–85 (1845).  
 78. See THE DEVELOPMENT OF CIVIL LAW FROM ROMAN LEGAL TRADITIONS, supra note 
23, at 67. 
 79. THE DEVELOPMENT OF EUROPEAN CIVIL LAW, supra note 23, at 79–80. 
 80. FÖLDI & HAMZA, supra note 24, at 264. 
 81. ISTVÁN WERBÖCZI, TRIPARTITUM, translated in THE CUSTOMARY LAW OF THE 
RENOWNED KINGDOM OF HUNGARY:  A WORK IN THREE PARTS, THE “TRIPARTITUM” (Janos M. 
Bak et al. eds., 2005). 
 82. FRANK, supra note 77, at 179. 
 83. Id. at 183–85. 
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2.  Civil Law in the Second Half of the Nineteenth Century 
In the second half of the nineteenth century, the above rigid 
regulations restricting the freedom of a ward of custody or a person 
under guardianship were significantly relaxed, principally as a 
consequence of the adoption of Act XX of 1877. In addition, the terms 
custody and guardianship were redefined.84 In the evolving civil law 
(which was based on customary law), a differentiation was made 
between the two legal forms—a differentiation which had come from 
Roman law into the civil law systems.85 As a result, adults could now 
only be under guardianship.86  
The German and Austrian models were the primary influences on 
the development of Hungarian civil law.87 Thus, based on judicial 
practice, in addition to minors aged under twelve years, “lunatics” (to 
use the contemporary term) and “those with temporary mental 
disturbances” were placed under custody with no active legal capacity.88 
Persons aged between twelve and twenty-four years and “the weak-
minded, deaf-dumb, and wayward fools” were placed under custody 
with restricted active legal capacity.89 Based on the above, one can see 
that Hungarian law included some of the strictest restrictions in 
Europe—in Hungary, even a serious hearing or speech disability was 
considered grounds for restricted active legal capacity.90 These highly 
restrictive rules were altered by a civil law bill, whose provisions were 
applied by the courts even though they were only adopted and not 
proclaimed by the Lower House of the National Assembly.91 The new 
provisions included, almost word for word, the stipulations of the 
 
 84. See 1877. évi XX. törvény a gyámsági és gondnoksági ügyek rendezéséről [Act XX of 
1877 on the Settlement of Guardianship and Guardianship Matters] § 28 (Hung.); SZLADITS, 
supra note 8, at 80–81.  
 85. SZLADITS, supra note 8, at 173 (describing the evolution of the Hungarian system and 
the influence of Roman and customary Hungarian law). 
 86. See THE HUNGARIAN DISABILITY CAUCUS, DISABILITY RIGHTS OR DISABLING 
RIGHTS? 148 (2010), available at http://mdac.info/sites/mdac.info/files/English_Disability%20 
Rights%20or%20Disabling%20Rights%20CRPD%20Alternative%20Report.pdf (custody only 
used to refer to children’s being in the custody of their parents; otherwise the “custody” of the 
adult disabled is referred to as “guardianship”). 
 87. SZLADITS, supra note 8, at 173 (“Through the influence of Austrian institutions and 
doctrine, the spirit of Roman-German law systems begins to penetrate, considerably altering the 
original character of our private law.”). 
 88. ÁRMIN FODOR, MAGYAR MAGÁNJOG [HUNGARIAN CIVIL LAW] 311 (1903). 
 89. Id. at 310–11. 
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 91. See Grzybowski, supra note 75, at 253.  
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German Civil Code relating to active legal capacity and restricted active 
legal capacity.92  
In the latter half of the nineteenth century and the early years of the 
twentieth century, Hungarian civil law clearly followed the pattern set 
by German law.93 Thus, in Hungary too, the traditional medical 
approach to active legal capacity was applied. Moreover, the rules of 
legal protection were also similar.94  
3.  The Operative Hungarian Civil Code 
Although prescribed as early as 1848, the codification of 
Hungarian civil law did not take place until 1959 with the adoption of 
the operative Hungarian Civil Code.95 The Code’s approach to the 
regulation of passive and active legal capacity was a modern one. 
In line with traditional civil law, the 1959 act made a distinction—
with regard to adults—between custody without active legal capacity 
and custody with diminished active legal capacity.96 This distinction 
was based on whether or not a cognitive incapacity was present, which 
was normally verified by a medical opinion.97 As far as diminished 
active legal capacity was concerned, the legal protection measures 
employed in the nineteenth century codes were used.98 Even so, 
reflecting an attempt to respond to the challenges of the era, the 
Hungarian Civil Code recognized the validity of the everyday legal 
transactions of persons with diminished active legal capacity.99  
4.  Provisions in Constitutional and Labor Law Relating to Active Legal 
Capacity 
Having surveyed the rules of Hungarian civil law relating to active 
legal capacity, owing to their special significance, we now examine the 
 
 92. See 1959. évi IV törvény a Polgári Törvénykönyvről [Act IV of 1959 on the Civil Code] 
§ 14 (Hung.); see also THE DEVELOPMENT OF CIVIL LAW FROM ROMAN LEGAL TRADITIONS, 
supra note 23, at 138–39. 
 93. CATHERINE DUPRÉ, IMPORTING THE LAW IN POST-COMMUNIST TRANSITIONS:  THE 
HUNGARIAN CONSTITUTIONAL COURT AND THE RIGHT TO HUMAN DIGNITY 95 (2003). 
 94. See MENTAL DISABILITY ADVOCACY CTR., NATIONAL IMPLEMENTATION PROCESS OF 
THE CONVENTION ON THE RIGHTS OF PERSONS WITH DISABILITIES 2 (2008), available at 
http://www2.ohchr.org/english/issues/disability/docs/consultation/Civilsocietyinputs/hungary 
MDAC.doc [hereinafter MDAC REPORT]. 
 95. THE DEVELOPMENT OF EUROPEAN CIVIL LAW, supra note 23, at 177. 
 96. See 1959. évi IV törvény a Polgári Törvénykönyvről [Act IV of 1959 on the Civil Code] 
§ 14 (Hung.). 
 97. Id. § 15(5). 
 98. Hungary:  Parliament Reforms Legal Capacity Laws, supra note 17.  
 99. LENKOVICS & SZÉKELY, supra note 27, at 27.  
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development of provisions in constitutional law (electoral law) and 
labor law relating to the active legal capacity of persons with 
intellectual disabilities in the twentieth century.  
When voting rights became universal, there was no change in the 
rule that a person under limited or full custody had neither active nor 
passive voting rights.100  
As a consequence of its roots in civil law, labor law tended to 
apply the civil law notion of active legal capacity, which resulted in 
situations that were difficult to interpret.101 This was true, above all, in 
the case of persons under custody with no active legal capacity, which is 
often the case even today.102  
By way of summary, we can state that Hungarian legal regulations 
historically have tended to follow European examples, and that in the 
modern era, Hungarian law has adopted contemporary regulations 
which assist the country’s modernization.  
III.  A NEW APPROACH IN MODERN CONSTITUTIONAL AND CIVIL LAW TO 
THE PASSIVE AND ACTIVE LEGAL CAPACITY OF PERSONS WITH 
INTELLECTUAL DISABILITIES 
A.  The Constitutional Legal Basis of Provisions Relating to the Passive 
and Active Legal Capacity of Persons with Intellectual Disabilities 
The constitutional legal approach to the rights of persons with 
intellectual disabilities appeared in the second half of the twentieth 
century in industrialized countries.103 In part, there were historical 
reasons for this—the dictatorial governments of the first half of the 
twentieth century had grossly abused the rights of persons with 
disabilities. In this context, we cite the so-called “euthanasia” program 
in Germany, whereby the Nazis murdered tens of thousands of persons 
with moderate or severe intellectual disabilities.104  
In addition to such historical reasons, the issue also became more 
salient as persons with disabilities were assisted by technological 
developments to become active members of society. In view of such 
 
 100. See Hungary:  Parliament Reforms Legal Capacity Laws, supra note 17. 
 101. See id. 
 102. A MAGYAR MUNKAJOG I. [HUNGARIAN LABOR LAW VOL. I] 79–80 (Csilla Kollonay 
Lehoczyné ed., 2001).  
 103. See Jerome E. Bickenbach, Disability Human Rights, Law, and Policy, in HANDBOOK 
OF DISABILITY STUDIES 565, 571 (Gary L. Albrecht et al. eds., 2001). 
 104. Mosaic of Victims:  An Overview, U.S. HOLOCAUST MUSEUM, http://www.ushmm.org/ 
wlc/en/article.php?ModuleId=10005149 (last visited Oct. 15, 2011). 
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developments, the need arose to catalogue the rights of persons with 
disabilities and establish rules governing their legal protection.105 
Special legislation guaranteeing the rights of persons with 
disabilities was first adopted in the common law countries106 where, due 
to the aforementioned notion of legal capacity, the legal system offered 
broader opportunities for actions on behalf of persons with intellectual 
disabilities.107 In these countries, the legal system enabled legislation 
imposing an effective ban on discrimination. In the United States, the 
United Kingdom, Australia, and New Zealand, disability legislation was 
aimed primarily at preventing discrimination and ensuring equal 
opportunities.108  
In addition to the fight against discrimination, greater emphasis 
was given to ensuring the human dignity of people with disabilities,109 
which entailed the introduction of provisions addressing the problems of 
people with disabilities in their complexity. Going beyond the anti-
discrimination rules, the aim was to establish a kind of catalogue of 
rights for persons with disabilities and to ensure the application of these 
rights in all walks of life and in all areas of legislation. Among such 
legislations, the Hungarian Act on the Rights and Equal Opportunities 
of Persons with Disabilities (Act XXVI of 1998) had a pioneering 
significance, as it was one of the first pieces of legislation in the world 
to apply the holistic model of disability.110 A similar model was applied 
by Germany when drafting its legislation on the equality of people with 
disabilities.111 
The process of securing the rights of people with disabilities also 
significantly influenced the adoption of provisions concerning the active 
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legal capacity of persons with intellectual disabilities.112 It is now 
generally accepted that the application of basic rights and the operation 
of a democratic community are not possible if broad sections of the 
population are excluded from participation in society because they have 
been defined as lacking active legal capacity.  
B.  Changes in Modern Civil Law Affecting the Passive and Active 
Legal Capacity of Persons with Intellectual Disabilities 
The second half of the twentieth century saw changes in the 
passive and active legal capacity of persons with intellectual 
disabilities.113 The departure point was the fundamental rights approach 
to the rights of persons with disabilities.114 Following the adoption of 
legislation in the 1980s and 1990s based primarily on the ban of 
discrimination and the right to human dignity,115 there was a 
reconsideration of the provisions of civil law governing the withdrawal 
or restriction of a person’s active legal capacity.116 
The process had several phases. First, civil law codifications in the 
mid-twentieth century—for example, the operative Hungarian Civil 
Code (Act IV of 1959)—enabled the everyday transactions, such as 
buying food, of persons without capacity to function as valid legal 
transactions.117 This model was also applied in the recently enacted 
Section 105a of the German Civil Code.118 According to the code, even 
though the transactions of persons without capacity are invalid under 
the primary rule contained in Section 105, the transactions of adult 
persons without capacity that are necessary for satisfying their everyday 
needs do have legal effect, as long as the value and the consideration are 
proportionate and the transaction does not jeopardize the interests of the 
person without capacity.119 The second change, in the final third of the 
twentieth century, was the redefinition of the notion of incompetence.120 
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This primarily entailed a restructuring of the previous threefold 
division—age, the inability to express one’s will, and mental illness or 
intellectual disability.121 During this phase, as far as the definition of the 
notion of incompetence was concerned, the social approach became 
definitive.122 These provisions defined people who were unable to 
participate in society for various reasons, including intellectual 
disability or mental illness, as incapable of expressing free will or 
making a legal statement.123 
The third phase in the process was a redefinition of the notion of 
diminished active legal capacity.124 Under traditional civil law, 
diminished active legal capacity meant that among persons of limited 
cognitive reliability (due to age, intellectual disability, or mental 
illness), the consent of those exercising parental supervision or 
authority, such as custodians (or guardians, in the case of adults), was 
required for certain major legal transactions.125 Until the civil law 
reforms in the late twentieth century, this restriction applied to all 
aspects of life.126 It was in the common law countries that the 
opportunity first arose for only limited restrictions on legal autonomy of 
individuals.127 Where this innovation was applied, the consent of a 
guardian was necessary only with respect to those activities where the 
courts had ordered a restriction.128 In all other transactions, the 
individual in question had full active legal capacity.129 
The early twenty-first century saw a restructuring of the legal 
forms of restricted active legal capacity.130 Several models have arisen 
in this area as well. 
One of the models is based on the notion of legal capacity to be 
found in the common law countries and in English family law.131 Since 
legal capacity in the common law system embodies both passive and 
active legal capacity, the model prescribed the removal of the traditional 
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notion of legal incompetence.132 Under this model, which has appeared 
primarily in the law of former British colonies such as Canada, New 
Zealand, and Australia, all persons with disabilities have a certain 
capacity to act.133 Hence, in various areas and in certain legal matters, 
they have full capacity or their opinions must at least be taken into 
consideration. The application of this model assisted the implementation 
of the fundamental rights of persons with disabilities, mentioned in 
Subsection A of Part 1 of III. Full incompetence was effectively deemed 
a restriction of their constitutional rights.134 Thus, the countries adhering 
to this model adopted the legal position that it is incompatible with the 
framework of a democratic State if the active legal capacity of certain 
persons is restricted to such a degree that fundamental rights cannot be 
applied.135 It was also considered necessary in the common law model 
that there should be legal means of offering assistance to such persons 
as they make their decisions, and that such means of assistance should 
respect their integrity and autonomy.136 
In addition to the common law countries, the model has also 
appeared in Europe. For example, it was applied in the Estonian draft 
bill of 2002, which proposed an amendment to the General Provisions 
of the Estonian Civil Code adopted in 1994.137 The bill sought the 
abolition of full guardianship (with no active legal capacity), but it was 
rejected by the Estonian legislature.138 
The complete withdrawal of a person’s active legal capacity—or a 
restricted active legal capacity where all legal transactions are subject to 
the restriction with the exception of everyday transactions—was 
regarded as incompatible with fundamental constitutional rights in the 
common law countries.139 This also became the position under the 
German model, which expanded the freedom of persons with 
disabilities to make decisions as well.140 In the revised German Civil 
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Code, guardianship without active legal capacity theoretically has not 
been abolished, even though Section 105a allows for persons without 
active legal capacity under guardianship to proceed independently in 
everyday transactions.141 But the rules on guardianship for persons 
without active legal capacity were abrogated in the German Code of 
Civil Procedure (Zivilprozessordnung (ZPO)).142  
Nevertheless, with the abrogation of Sections 113–115, 
guardianship with diminished active legal capacity was replaced by the 
institution of assisted decision-making not restricting active legal 
capacity. Under the amended Section 1897 of the German Civil Code, 
assisted decision-making can be ordered by a court with responsibility 
for matters of guardianship, but only in specific spheres of authority, not 
generally.143 Courts may also appoint different “supporters” (“carers”) 
for different spheres of authority; another possibility is that the tasks of 
a supporter are carried out by an association or an official authority.144 
The nomination is subject to the agreement of the supported person, and 
the German Civil Code regards the relationship between a person with 
disabilities and his or her supporter as one of trust. The amended 
sections of the code lay down special procedural rules for major issues, 
such as choosing where to live, signing a rent agreement, or making 
certain legal statements pertaining to healthcare.145  
These models have exerted a major influence on the recent 
codification of rights of the person, and a consideration of their basic 
features has also led to the development of mixed models, combining 
elements of the two concepts.146 
In modern civil rights, the classical formulas of the nineteenth 
century that were based on Roman law (or on traditional common law 
in common law countries) have been replaced by a new approach, 
owing in large part to changes in the area of constitutional rights.147 
Since the mid-twentieth century, the rigid provisions governing 
incompetence and diminished active legal capacity have been relaxed 
by ensuring the right to proceed in everyday transactions and by 
amending the notions of incompetence and restricted active legal 
capacity in the sense that active legal capacity is now determined for the 
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various fields of authority. In the civil law legislation of the early 
twenty-first century, we can distinguish two main models with respect 
to the above notions:  the common law model, which has effectively 
abolished guardianship without active legal capacity and now only 
recognizes restricted active legal capacity,148 and the German model, 
which has introduced assisted decision-making as a replacement for the 
institution of guardianship with diminished active legal capacity.149  
IV.  THE UNITED NATIONS’ CONVENTION ON THE RIGHTS OF PERSONS 
WITH DISABILITIES AND THE OPTIONAL PROTOCOL 
In Subsection A of Part III, we noted that at the beginning of the 
twenty-first century, there was increasing acceptance throughout the 
international community of the need for national legislation to guarantee 
the rights of persons with disabilities and of the duty of governments to 
ensure the application of these rights.  
With regard for national legislative efforts and developments in 
European Community law in this field150 and, following an initiative by 
the international disability organizations, work began on drafting a 
global disability convention under the auspices of the United Nations.151 
As a result of several years of preparatory work, the United Nations 
General Assembly adopted the CRPD and its Optional Protocol on 
December 13, 2006.152 In 2007, Hungary became the second country to 
ratify the Convention (Act XCII of 2007).153 
The Convention contains a partial catalogue of the rights of 
persons with disabilities. Article 12 of the Convention contains 
provisions relating to legal capacity and the exercising of legal 
capacity.154 
For a proper interpretation of Article 12, it is necessary once again 
to refer to the notion of legal capacity as it is understood in common 
law systems. In common law systems with their procedural legal 
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approach, an entitlement (right) must entail a right to sue.155 Similarly to 
the capacity to sue and be sued of the Hungarian Civil Procedure 
Code,156 passive legal capacity and active legal capacity are closely 
linked in common law countries for this reason.  
Legal capacity is used in Article 12 of the Convention, which 
relates to equality before the law.157 The strong influence of the legal 
system introduced to many parts of the world under the former British 
Empire and the incompatibility of this system with the civil law system 
(including differences of terminology) meant that translators of the 
Convention were faced with a difficult task. With respect to Article 12, 
it should be emphasized that the aim was to broaden the decision-
making powers of persons with disabilities (in particular, persons with 
intellectual disabilities) in order to ensure their human dignity, 
independence, and ability to express opinions.158 
Having regard for the close connection between the common law 
notion of legal capacity and the civil law notion of active legal capacity 
(capacity to act), one should note that Article 12(1) of the Convention 
provides that persons with disabilities have the right to recognition 
everywhere as persons before the law.159 This provision was important 
because the traditional legal systems in some United Nations member 
States fail to recognize people with disabilities as persons before the 
law.160 
The provisions of Article 12(2)–(5) aim to maximize the decision-
making autonomy of persons with disabilities, permitting only 
necessary and proportional restrictions.161 In civil law systems, decision-
making autonomy indicates the presence of an active legal capacity. 
Thus, these provisions of the article clearly relate to active legal 
capacity. Reflecting modern legal development, the Convention seeks to 
ensure that active legal capacity is restricted only under exceptional 
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circumstances in order to minimize the possibility of abuse. 
Furthermore, in place of restrictions, it proposes assisted decision-
making wherever possible.162  
In light of the above, we can state that the Convention aims to 
extend the results of recent developments in civil law to areas beyond 
the countries where the model has already been successfully 
established, thereby promoting the decision-making autonomy of 
persons with intellectual disabilities. Wherever possible, the Convention 
seeks to establish means for replacing the institution of guardianship, 
which restricts or obstructs independent decision-making.  
V.  HUNGARIAN LAW—WITH SPECIAL REGARD FOR THE PRONOUNCED 
BUT NOT OPERATIVE PROVISIONS OF THE NEW CIVIL CODE 
A.  The Laws in Force 
Surveying the provisions of the Convention, which have now been 
incorporated into Hungarian law, we may ask whether the operative 
domestic Hungarian law satisfies the obligations contained in 
Article 12. The summary answer is that it does not, but it is attempting 
to do so.  
The provisions governing active legal capacity have recently 
undergone substantial changes in order to ensure the human rights of 
persons with intellectual disabilities as much as possible.  
An important change was the 2001 amendment (Act XV of 2001) 
to the provisions of the Hungarian Civil Code relating to active legal 
capacity. According to the ministerial argument, the amendment was 
made in reflection of Council of Europe Recommendation R (99) 4 of 
February 23, 1999, on Principles Concerning the Legal Protection of 
Incapable Adults.163 The amendment to the Hungarian Civil Code 
altered the rules governing restricted active legal capacity.164 Under the 
amendment, a court can only impose a restriction in certain fields of 
authority.165 The active legal capacity of an adult remains complete in 
areas that are not subject to the court-imposed restriction.166  
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In addition to amending the substantive legal provisions of the 
Hungarian Civil Code, the provisions relating to the procedure for 
guardianship were also altered.167 First, guardianships were made 
subject to compulsory review, in the course of which the subject of 
guardianship is to be heard unless there are exceptional 
circumstances.168 The aim of these provisions is to ensure that 
restrictions of a person’s active legal capacity are indeed necessary and 
proportional.  
Act XV of 2001 resulted in a paradigm shift in the legal provisions 
relating to active legal capacity, as both the Hungarian Civil Code and 
the Code of Civil Procedure dispensed with the model of the nineteenth-
century codifications.169 
It should be noted that the change in approach took place only at 
the level of civil law.170 Courts rarely make use of the institution of 
partially diminished active legal capacity; moreover, public legal 
provisions were not adjusted to this system.171 This is particularly 
evident in the area of electoral law. A person without active legal 
capacity or with diminished active legal capacity has neither active nor 
passive voting rights, even when the guardianship restricting his or her 
active legal capacity does not extend to withdrawal of public legal 
entitlements.172 Under the Hungarian Civil Code, however, he or she 
would theoretically be completely capable.173  
Although they represent a substantial advancement in comparison 
to previous regulations, the above provisions of the Hungarian Civil 
Code are not in accord with the provisions of Article 12 of the CRDP. 
First, the Hungarian Civil Code permits active legal capacity to be 
restricted or even denied in many instances, thereby obstructing the 
decision-making autonomy of persons with intellectual disabilities.174 
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Second, it does not provide a direct access to legal assistant, 
independent of the guardian.175  
B.  The Provisions of the New, Pronounced but Not Operative, 
Hungarian Civil Code 
Hungarian compliance with the Convention was to be achieved 
through the adoption of a new Hungarian Civil Code, which was 
pronounced as Act CXX of 2009.176 This Act is no longer operative—
the Hungarian Constitution Court annulled Act XV of 2010 on 
operation of Act CXX of 2010 on the Hungarian Civil Code because of 
the violation of legal certainty.177 The 51st Constitutional Court 
Resolution of 2010 (28th April) stated that the two-month preparation 
time for the operation of the first two books of the new Hungarian Civil 
Code was too short, and annulled the Operation Act of the new 
Hungarian Civil Code.178 
In Subsection B of Part III, we briefly examined the main models 
seeking to extend the decision-making autonomy of persons with 
intellectual disabilities. Among these, the abolition of guardianship with 
no active legal capacity was the most common method employed in the 
common law countries,179 while in the German-speaking countries, the 
institution of guardianship with no active legal capacity has been partly 
retained, but restricted guardianship has been replaced by assisted 
decision-making, which enhances autonomy by providing appropriate 
and effective assistance rather than restricting a person’s decision-
making powers.180 
In regard to the above models, the pronounced but not operative 
New Hungarian Civil Code may be regarded as a mixed system:  first, it 
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abolishes guardianship with no active legal capacity, recognizing only 
restricted guardianship.181 Second, as a replacement for restricted 
guardianship, it provides other legal forms that do not affect a person’s 
active legal capacity; in this area, it adheres almost word for word to the 
provisions of the amended German Civil Code, which introduced 
assisted decision-making, prior legal statement, and guardianship 
without diminished active legal capacity.182 The new Hungarian Civil 
Code lists those matters in respect to which guardianship can be 
imposed.183 It also seems to try to address longstanding problems 
relating to active legal capacity in the field of labor law and 
employment of workers with intellectual disabilities. 
These progressive provisions of the pronounced but not operative 
Hungarian Civil Code should ensure that Hungarian law more or less 
conforms to the provisions of the Convention.184 Owing to the 
substantial restrictions contained in the provisions, however, certain 
regulatory elements may lead to results that were not anticipated in the 
Convention. For instance, where an adult has been placed under a 
guardianship without a restriction of his or her active legal capacity, 
theoretically the person would be able to marry even without the 
consent of the appointed guardian, which is usually the parent.  
In connection with the above provisions of the new Hungarian 
Civil Code, it should be reiterated that when the Code is adopted, the 
public legal provisions governing active legal capacity would also have 
to be amended. The enhancement of active legal capacity in civil law 
will create an ambiguous situation, unless provisions are adopted to 
enable the person’s effective participation in society and involvement in 
the community.  
By way of summary, despite a significant shift in the legislative 
approach in 2001, current and operative Hungarian law does not comply 
fully with the provisions of the Convention. The problem could be 
resolved through the adoption of the new Hungarian Civil Code which 
has been drafted recently, but even if this new code is adopted, 
amendments to public legal provisions would still be required. 
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VI.  CONCLUSION 
The aim of this study has been to present the main regulatory 
framework relating to passive and active legal capacity—a framework 
that forms the basis for the participation in society of persons with 
intellectual disabilities. 
We tried, firstly, to determine the meaning of passive and active 
legal capacity. It was underlined that the most important legal effect of 
intellectual disability is the restriction or complete removal of active 
legal capacity. We examined the role of active legal capacity (a capacity 
to act) in the various legal systems and the reasons for restrictions. We 
found that, initially, restrictions were placed on a person’s active legal 
capacity because of a limited capacity to participate in society and 
comply with the norms of the era.185 Then, as medicine developed, the 
medical-physiological approach to disability became dominant but was 
replaced in the second half of the twentieth century by the medical or 
social approach to disability.186 It was established that a sharp distinction 
between passive and active legal capacity is made only in civil law 
systems based on Roman law.187 In common law systems, the general 
term competency is used. 188 That is to say, no real distinction is made 
between passive and active legal capacity. 
We then surveyed the legislative developments and historical 
changes in universal and Hungarian history, from the classical period to 
the mid-twentieth century. Examining the various models employed in 
the major countries, we concluded that in traditional legal systems, 
people with disabilities were sometimes denied passive legal capacity 
and often their active legal capacity was not recognized. An exception 
to this was the “lucidum intervallum” recognized in post-classical 
Roman law, during which a person with disabilities was considered to 
have full legal capacity.189 In the nineteenth century, alongside the 
medical-physiological approach, there was a general recognition of the 
passive legal capacity of persons with disabilities.190 Depending on the 
gravity of impairment, however, their active legal capacity was 
restricted partially or fully.191 
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The development of civil law and, in a related sense, constitutional 
law resulted in substantial changes in the second half of the twentieth 
century. In light of the inhumanity and grave abuse of the dictatorships 
in the 1930s and 1940s,192 in the second half of the twentieth century, 
various international legal agreements were established with provisions 
relating to the rights of persons with disabilities.193 The initial approach 
was to ensure the application of the ban on discrimination, but in the 
1990s, there was an increasing acceptance that regulations should 
address disability in a holistic manner.194 Since then, international law 
has been developing in this direction as reflected in the United Nations 
Convention of 2007.195 
Starting in the 1970s, and concurrently with international legal 
developments, common law countries began to adopt legislation on the 
rights of persons with disabilities, with an aim to ensure the 
implementation of the ban on discrimination.196 Following the example 
of the common law countries, in the 1990s and the early years of the 
twenty-first century, similar laws were passed in most advanced 
democracies.197 Going beyond the original concept employed in the 
common law countries, the more recent legislation has tended to be of a 
complex nature—ensuring not only the application of the ban on 
discrimination, but also the introduction of specific provisions relating 
to disability.198  
The fundamental rights approach of national legislation has 
influenced civil law, too. Starting from the 1950s onward, persons with 
diminished active legal capacity became increasingly able to undertake 
the transactions necessary to address the needs of everyday life.199 This 
change did not initially affect the basic elements of the regulatory 
framework relating to active legal capacity.200 In the final three decades 
of the twentieth century, however, the conditions were established for a 
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paradigm shift.201 The changes initially affected the notion of 
diminished active legal capacity; in place of a general restriction, there 
were opportunities for the imposition of a partial restriction—a 
restriction on certain areas of a person’s active legal capacity.202  
In addition to the above changes, the 1990s saw the development 
of several models based on the paradigm shift. In common law 
countries, based on the principle of equality before the law, the 
complete removal of legal capacity was ruled out; in most cases, 
diminished legal capacity became the norm.203 In civil law countries 
(particularly in Germany after a general revision of the German Civil 
Code) a full restriction on active legal capacity was still possible so long 
as there were opportunities for conducting the transactions necessary for 
everyday life); nevertheless, the use of partial restrictions on active legal 
capacity was expanded with the introduction of assisted decision-
making.204 When implementing civil law reforms, other countries have 
applied one of these two models, or a combination of both.205 
In the second half of the twentieth century, Hungary attempted to 
develop modern legislation reflecting the interests of people with 
disabilities.206 Accordingly, under the Hungarian Civil Code, persons 
with disabilities with diminished active legal capacity received the 
ability to proceed in everyday transactions.207 Hungary was the first 
country in the world to adopt disability legislation regulating, in a 
horizontal sense, the rights of persons with disabilities.208 Hungary was 
also the second country to ratify the CRPD.209 In the field of civil law, 
the partial restriction (restriction according to area of authority) of 
active legal capacity has been possible since 2001.210 Even so, 
Hungarian law has yet to comply fully with the provisions of the United 
Nations Convention—provisions, which are based on the common law 
system approach to legal capacity. In Hungary, the right of a person to 
active legal capacity is still subject to limitations. In this respect, the 
adoption of a new Hungarian Civil Code would result in a significant 
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change. Combining the common law and civil law models will abolish 
guardianship excluding active legal capacity and it will also introduce 
several legal institutions that ensure the effective implementation of the 
rights of persons with psychosocial disabilities while placing no 
restrictions on active legal capacity. The adoption of the new Hungarian 
Civil Code will ensure that Hungarian law complies with the provisions 
of the United Nations Convention, thereby establishing a legal 
framework that attends to the specific circumstances, interests, and 
needs of people with disabilities. 
